9 November 1953

Categorizing recommendations in so broad a field is a difficult task. However I think that the following remarks are the most pertinent in looking at the general situation.

What do I think the difficulties are and were and how can they be corrected? Let's start at the beginning.

### Hiring

First we must face the fact that we were hired as "bodies". Nothing more. Granted bodies that were, in general, idealistic, well motivated and relatively intelligent. At the time, though, we were not too choosy, feeling that we were delivering ourselves into competent hands capable of molding the potential along lines which would lead to the formation of a career in government service. This assumption proved false. The veil of security was used to cloak ignorance, or perhaps better, a lack of a well-defined plan, a definite job.

What else was wrong in the initial stages? Certainly the military question ran among the leaders. Numerous people, including myself were told to <u>forget</u> military commissions. Mention of such a subject brought a wise and knowing, "Don't worry about it. We'll take care of your military problems."

What should have been done?

We should have been contacted according to our capabilities and the job that these capabilities could perform in the future. We should have been told that we

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would receive the lowest type work, that the training would be strongly competitive and that the incapable would be eliminated to make way for the capable. With all this, however, we should have been assured that this lowest type work would be instructive and would show us the way to a professional status in the future. And finally the so-called cover story given after the first interview. There was nothing prepared, nothing which could hold water for more than five minutes among people who knew you.

### Training

As a para-military trainee I find no real cause for complaint. It was extremely well handled. The leadership was competent beyond our expectations. The work was hard, the program well planned. At the conclusion of training there was a stronger esprit de corps than I have ever experienced in any field of endeavor. In terms of the times the training was realistic. This, of course, is now different.

## Post Training

Here came the first real kick in the pants. We reported to the office to which we had been assigned. How were we received? It ran something like this. Who are you? What training have you had? What is your grade? Do you speak any languages? The first positive statement was, "Come back in a few days. By then we should be able to find something for you to do."

Is there any conceivable excuse for this type hiring? A commercial concern would go out of business in a few months by following a policy as haphazard as this. There is no reason for our superiors' lack of knowledge. They should have

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read our training reports (which were produced in great volumes, filed, and never removed from the safe again), visited us during training, talked to us, all with the intention of deciding where we could fit into their organization. What was the result of this? The answer is simple. We started on the very first day with a sour taste in our mouths. This primary stagnation lasted anywhere from two months to a year. Then we came overseas.

### Overseas Assignment

The same old problems. No definite jobs. No idea of who we were or what we could do. Another of the more discouraging factors was the complete lack of anything resembling adequate cover. After a very short stay we were forced to assume that we were blown.

After settling into the picture we soon discovered that we were learning very little. Admitting ignorance we were ready to learn. This desire was stifled by leaders who, in many cases, were competent in their own fields, but who did not know how or did not want to train us to do a good job.

Another important fact lies in the way we were isolated from the population.

One of the most important factors in being a good intelligence officer is knowing the people in foreign lands, their language, customs, habits, political activities. If a tally were to be taken of the people of our organization who have been assigned in and who have learned the language, etc., I think the figures would be rather shocking. Probably less than 25% have made strides along these lines.

Why? The answer is quite simple.

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It is too easy to remain untouched by the surroundings, too easy to hide behind the skirts

#### The Return Home

This is a source of fear and anxiety for all. From others we know that for the third time we will return and be asked, "Who are you? What have you done? We'll see if we can find a place for you." There will be no assignment waiting, no additional training planned.

#### The Future

In general we do not ask a great deal. We only ask that we be allowed to perform a job under the guidance of competent leaders. We want to perform in positions which will show us whether or not we are in the right business and where our superiors can judge us fairly.

#### Remarks

I do not think that a rate of attrition of 50% is too high to expect from a group hired fresh out of college. Statistically it would probably compare well with a business firm's average over a five or six year period. But if you will check the statistics on the fourth para-military training class I think that you will find that the statistics are already over 75%. This in less than three years. Present indications point to the fact that the 100% figure is by no means out of the question. The saddest part of the entire story is that among these people there will be many capable people who did not feel that they could afford to remain in positions where there was nothing to be seen in the years to come but frustration, disappointment, and complete lack of personal achievement and gratification coming from knowing that you have done a good job. What will re-

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main? Those unable to find other jobs, those economically unable to chance starting in something new, and those lacking the initiative to leave something which offers no promise of future improvement.